Abstract
INTRODUCTION
Information asymmetry is a fundamental issue in financial markets. The effect of information asymmetry is undeniable when determining market function and explaining its complexities. Trading stocks creates legal rights and commitments for firms and investors. Basically, firms must commit to repayment of the principal and interest in due time, but beyond all legal regulations, a stock contract is at risk in terms of economic considerations.
The intrinsic uncertainty of each investment project challenges a firm's ability to cover published stock. This obstacle can affect stock value logically and by estimating probability. Another obstacle is breach of commitment in a stock contract by a firm. Firms can hide the nature of a project, deflect inputting capital from its original route, or hide actual results. Uneven distribution of information can cause different results. Before it is considered by individual users, determining the quality of the information distributed is important.
Researchers have developed measures to determine the level of information asymmetry because is not directly observable. These measures fall into three categories (Clarke and Shastri, 2000) . The first category uses measures based on growth opportunities and argues that firms with more growth opportunities have a symmetrical information environment. The second category uses measures based on predicted profit and argues that an increase in the level of a firm's information leads to convergence of expectations of that firm's future profits. The third category uses a series of measures based on market microstructure literature that are commonly compared with other categories.
The present study measured information asymmetry in selected firms on the Tehran Stock Exchange using two indexes from the second and third categories. The PIN index (Probability of Informed Trade) falls into the third category; the FE index (Earning Forecast Error) falls into the second category and was used to verify the results. There are many criteria to measuring information asymmetry, but most of them are suitable for developed markets. In most of developing markets they are not able to measuring information asymmetry singly and significantly. Therefore, we tried to investigate this issue. The Tehran Stock Exchange is one of the best examples of developing markets. Differences in the results by the two indices led to the use of a composite measure of these indices that considers both profit forecast and market structure. This new index calculates both general information asymmetry at beginning of a period and detailed information asymmetry over time.
LITERATURE REVIEW
In the context of information asymmetry measures based on market microstructure literature, Demsetz (1968) introduced a range of bid-ask prices (spread). The spread has been commonly used as a proxy for information asymmetry in previous studies. Analytical models such as Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) predicted that information asymmetry increases the adverse selection risk of market makers (liquidity providers), which increases the spread and decreases market depth and, as a result, decreases liquidity. Higher levels of information asymmetry will combine to form a larger spread. Using the spread to control a firm's informational environment, Healy and Palepu (1995) and Welker (1995) found a negative (positive) relationship between spread and the quality of information disclosure (information asymmetry). Healy et al. (1999) and Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) showed that information asymmetry, the spread, and volatility of stock prices are negatively associated with quality disclosure.
Many measures of the bid-ask spread have been used. Stoll (2000) found that the spread protects market makers against losses from trade with informed investors; thus, they expand the spread in order to limit informed traders and limit the spread to attract liquidity traders. Hasbrouck (2009) found a relatively high correlation between various spread measures (~90%). Richardson (2000) , Mohd (2005) , Attig et al. (2006 ), Jayaraman (2008 and Bhattacharya et al. (2009) used different spread indices to measure information asymmetry. O'Hara (1987 and 1992) offered a model of order flow in the market that can estimate the probability of random trading by an informed trader (PIN). Also Easley et al. (1997b) argued about information content between trades, Easley et al. (1997a) about trade size, Easley et al. (1998) about analyst coverage, Easley et al. (2001) about stock splits, and Easley et al. (2002) about asset pricing. Many studies used PIN index as proxy of information asymmetry, such as Heidle and Huang (2002) , Vega (2006) , Ascioglu et al. (2008) , Brockman and Yan (2009), Kang (2010) , Aslan et al. (2011) , Abad and Yague (2012) , Chen and Zhao (2012) , Dey and Radhakrishna (2015) , Lin et al. (2013) , Sankaraguruswamy et al. (2013) , Chang and Lin (2015) , Agudelo et al. (2015) and Paparizos et al. (2016) .
METHODOLOGY
Information asymmetry is a feature of many trades. Often, seller information about quality is greater than buyer information. On the stock market, information plays an important role and its acquisition cost is gradual. According to Crawford et al. (2015) we assume which is visible investors of type , and is firms in stock markets , and term. Investors gain the utility for stock that is dependent on their demands as follows:
Utility for the outside option is normalized to zero. Investors will choose firms that maximize their utility or avoid buying securities. Provided that they invest in stocks, they will choose a share of capital for which their utility is maximized as follows:
(2) And investors will choose to default if the following utility is greater than zero:
In above equations, are firms visible features, are prices, are firms invisible features, are investors visible feature and are type of fixed effects. Also assumed to be are is distributed as a type of extreme value (Crawford et al., 2015; Berry et al., 1995) . Crawford et al. (2015) assumed random coefficient of the demand's constant term ̅ , with that have normally distributed with and , so that:
There is a positive correlation between invisible demand by investors and default ( ), that is evidence of information asymmetry. If there exists a positive correlation between invisible demand and invisible default, investors with higher risk will create a greater demand for stocks. The argument of correlation between and is that if an investor who the model predicts should not be willing to buy stocks is observed to buy stocks, then this denotes an investor with high . A positive correlation between and is evidence of information asymmetry. The interpretation of a positive correlation between stock size and invisible default ( ) is also evidence of information asymmetry. O'Hara (1987 and 1992) offered a model of order flow in the market that can be used to estimate the probability of random trading by an informed trader (PIN). A higher the PIN value (0 to 1) indicates more confidential information or higher levels of information asymmetry (Wan, 2009) . The basic assumption is that public information is directly reflected in prices without the need for trading activity, while confidential information is reflected in unusual orders (surplus Bid and Ask orders).
Figure no. 1 shows informed trade mechanism. Assuming that α is the probability of an informational event, then δ is the probability of bad news, and 1-δ is the probability of good news on a specific day. If no informational event (with probability 1-α) occurs, only uninformed traders (Liquidity) will trade in the market. On this day, the arrival rate of uninformed traders (what to buy or sell) will have an independent Poisson distribution with probability ε. Informed traders will be willing to trade only in the event of an informational event (with probability μ). If they receive good news, they will buy and, if they receive bad news, they will sell their stocks. For informed traders on a specific day, if the occurrence is a bad informational event (with probability δα), the arrival rate of buy orders (α) will be less than that of sell orders (ε + μ). If the occurrence is a good informational event (with probability α(1-δ)), the arrival rate of buy orders (ε + μ) will be greater than the sell orders (ε). Easley and O'Hara (1992) stated that the probability of trading based on information for a specific stock ( ) as defined by the estimated arrival rate of informed trading divided by the estimated arrival rate of all trades in a specific day is as follows (Vega, 2006) : Easley et al. (1996) stated that, under these conditions, a market maker is assumed to be Bayesian if he uses the information to trade and update his expectations about good news, bad news, or no news. At time t, before the start of trading, market maker expectation for the probability of no news, good news, or bad news are as follows: (6) (7) ( 8) Therefore if B and S Represent buy and sell orders at time t, | is Represents the market maker's updated expectation when a sell order arriving, | is expectation about no news when a sell order arriving, | is his updated probability of bad news when a sell order arrives, and | is his updated probability of good news when a sell order arriving at time t. Probabilities when a buy order arriving are represented in a similar way. According to Easley et al. (1996) , using Bayes's rule, his posterior probability on no news when a sell order arrives at time t is:
The posterior probability on bad news and good news are the as follows respectively:
The zero expected profit bid price is the expected value of the stock at time t. So, the bid is:
and the ask is:
Where Represents the value of the stock when no news. So expected value of the stock is:
With substituting equation (14) into equation (12) and (13):
These equations considering the stock expected value, improve analysis of entering role of informed and uninformed investors in affecting trading prices. Now spread defined by the difference between ask and bid prices:
With these explanation, All four parameters that used in PIN formula (θ { }), estimated by maximizing following likelihood function:
That for determine the direction of trading, used Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm (Vega, 2006) . Also, in order to estimate parameter vector θ, for collection of data related to buy and sell ({ } ), can be used the product of the daily likelihoods, as follow:
As previously mentioned, according to O'Hara (1987 and 1992 ) the higher value of PIN (in the range of 0 to 1) shows higher levels of information asymmetry.
RESULTS
Several indices have been proposed to measuring information asymmetry. The present study used two indices to calculate information asymmetry on the Tehran Stock Exchange. The Tehran Stock Exchange is one of the best examples of developing markets and results of this market can be generalized to other developing stock markets. The PIN index was first calculated and then the forecast error (FE) was used to verify the PIN results. The average PIN value for SIPA was 0.06, which suggests very low information asymmetry in the market. In reality, this firm has a good chance with investors on the Tehran Stock Exchange. Six firms had PIN values of less than 0.1 (SIPA1, IKHR1, BHMN1, TMEL1, MKBT1, MSMI1). The PIN value for Khorasan Steel Co. (FKAS1) was approximately 0.72, which is significant for a large and active firm on the Tehran Stock Exchange; only three firms recorded PIN values greater than 0.40 (FKAS1, KSHJ1 and PNES1). Table no . 2 shows that the PIN index in 2010 had a maximum coefficient and in 2015 had minimum coefficient. In 2015, information asymmetry dropped considerably, which could have been in response to the increasing informational level of traders and good news in market that improved trader expectations about investing on the Tehran Stock Exchange. Positive political events played a strong role in this case. The PIN value has a direct relationship with instability on the Tehran Stock Exchange.
Probability of informed trade (PIN)

Earning forecast error (FE)
The FE index was used to calculate information asymmetry to verify the PIN results. Lang and Lundholm (1996) shows that increasing informational transparency improves forecast accuracy and decreases forecast dispersion and can be used as a measure of earnings forecast error to calculate information asymmetry. Using the method proposed by Christie (1987) , the FE was measured as the ratio of absolute difference between forecast earnings ( ) and actual earnings per share ( ) to calculate information asymmetry as:
Firms with a larger level of information asymmetry have higher FE (Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999) . Table no. 3 shows the FE for selected firms on the Tehran Stock Exchange. The FE value for the earnings for selected firms on the Tehran Stock Exchange were unusual; in 13 cases, the FE were more than 1000%. In 20 cases, the FE was 9% to 20%; these are the lowest FE values. Earnings data was not available for 2015 as the research was completed; therefore, the FE was not calculated for that year.
On average, Khalij Fars Industries (PKLJ1) recorded the maximum FE; however, this was based on published statistics for only two years (2013470 and 20141) The difference between mechanisms of PIN and FE indicated that the FE index calculates information asymmetry at the beginning of a period and the PIN index calculates information asymmetry over time. If a logical relation between these indices can be found that covers both mechanisms, a new more accurate index can be developed. This would be more suitable for emerging markets such as the Tehran Stock Exchange in which firm performance does not show great stability and political issues and outside influences have a strong effect on stock trends.
New composite index (C-PIN-FE)
The PIN is used in many financial studies, but cannot solely represent information asymmetry in emerging markets such as the Tehran Stock Exchange. The results found in the previous sections illustrate this; firms with very low PIN values show relatively high FE values. This means the forecasts differed from actual earnings significantly, which denotes high information asymmetry. Also, earnings FE cannot represent information asymmetry in stock markets properly because it does not directly consider information traders. This suggests the need for a composite index of PIN and FE that can better measure information asymmetry in emerging stock markets, especially during turbulent years. This composite index (C-PIN-FE) can be calculated as follows:
Because the PIN value falls between 0 and 1, but FE can be a number of any size, the PIN should be adjusted in the new index. The natural logarithm of PIN is, thus, obtained as a negative number and its value will be weighed as Ln(PIN) (Now larger numbers represent less information asymmetry). Because the goal is to measure information asymmetry and not to show the direction of important information, the absolute value of FE is used. This new composite index modifies the previous indices and offers a better measure of information asymmetry with emphasis on the characteristics of each index. It considers information, initial expectations, and adjusted information over time.
The results of this index for selected firms on the Tehran Stock Exchange are shown in Table no A review of the results of this new composite index and comparison with the previous indices show it presents a better measure for information asymmetry in markets such as the Tehran Stock Exchange. Where the PIN or FE are not able to explain and describe information asymmetry in markets on their own, the use of the C-PIN-FE index is recommended.
CONCLUSION
One reason for a breach in competition in the stock market is information asymmetry. In emerging stock markets with high volatility, trader information often differs. This holds true for the Tehran Stock Exchange. The present study measured information asymmetry in large and active firms on the Tehran Stock Exchange because investors have more information about these firms and a review their informational environment can be offered as a good indicator of the informational environment. The PIN and FE indices were initially used and it was shown that the PIN index, on average, showed information asymmetry of more than 20%. The PIN index predicts that information asymmetry will decrease considerably in 2015, because of political changes and improved market expectations.
To verify these results, the FE index was implemented, but presented unusual results. The FE values indicated that earnings forecasts were very different from actual earnings (in some cases more than 1000%). A comparison of the PIN and FE values reveals mismatched results when ranking firms based on information asymmetry. Because the FE index shows information asymmetry at the beginning of a period and the PIN index shows information asymmetry over time, a new composite index (C-PIN-FE) that uses the results and mechanism of both indices was developed. The C-PIN-FE index offers more reasonable results for ranking firms based on information asymmetry and corresponds with both PIN and FE results. It is suggested that the C-PIN-FE index more accurately measures information asymmetry in emerging, turbulent, and highly volatile stock markets showing large differences in earnings forecasts and dual functions.
